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 2 
Abstract 
 
 
 
Why and how do security institutions evolve? How is it that the European Union 
security architecture has changed so rapidly over the past ten years, without member 
states agreeing on a common vision of European integration in this field?  
This paper engages the current debate on the evolution of the European Union’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by investigating the role of knowledge 
and ideas in influencing further European integration. Structural and functional 
explanations – whether realist or liberal – are underdetermining, since they don’t 
fully account for the process of almost permanent expansion and reform that 
institutions and procedures underpinning CSDP have undergone over the last ten 
years. I argue that these theories need to be complemented by an approach 
emphasizing the role of “knowledge” as a key intervening variable between structure 
and agency. Accordingly, my research demonstrates that transnational networks of 
experts have fostered institutional and policy learning by promoting new principled 
and causal beliefs, leading to new values and strategic prescriptions.  
From an empirical standpoint, this research focuses on the development of a 
comprehensive approach to security, and specifically it analyzes the introduction of 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) principles and practices in the EU security 
policymaking. Since these new precepts have tremendously impacted on the current 
shape and activities of CSDP, locating their intellectual cradle and understanding 
how these norms were diffused its pivotal to gain a clearer idea of the institutions that 
handles security matters in today’s Europe.  While structural conditions after the end 
of the Cold War underpin the new strategic prescription of “comprehensive 
approach” and “security-development nexus”, the way communities of experts 
responded to these conditions and redefined EU security interests is essential to 
explain change at the institutional and policy levels.  
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 4 
Introduction 
 
 
Security challenges and threats are, by definition, subject to change, and so are 
security institutions and policies created to address them. Policymakers are always 
confronted with the difficult task of making sense of this evolution by assessing and 
tackling increasingly complex and diverse risks. In the contemporary post-1989 and 
post-9/11 international system, this sentiment of uncertainty and instability vis-à-vis 
international security seems to be predominant. The UK National Security Strategy 
released by the Coalition Government in October 2010 acknowledges that “Today, 
Britain faces a different and more complex range of threats from a myriad of sources” 
and that “no single risk will dominate…Therefore, achieving security will become 
more complex”1. In the same line, the European Security Strategy as of December 
2008 states “twenty years after the end of the Cold War (…), globalisation has made 
threats more complex and interconnected”2. 
The complexity of security challenges requires states to rely on international 
institutions and multilateral forms of security governance to confront common threats. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the neoliberal institutionalist literature has exhaustively 
accounted for the creation of institutions as a way to address these problems and 
foster cooperation among states on specific issues (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 
1989, 1990; Moravcsik, 1992; Deudney and Ikenberry, 1991).  
As a result, we know why institutions are created. But the question of “why and how” 
these institutions change and adjust their structures to new security concerns is one 
that still triggers fierce debates among IR scholars. Do processes of institutional 
change depend on systemic factors (as IR realism argues) and essentially rest on 
interstate bargains, spurring from the combination of exogenous/fixed member states 
preferences (Moravcsik, 1999)? Or do other mechanisms endogenous to institutions 
act as important drivers of change? And, since better institutions increase the 
prospects for cooperation, to what extent do institutions themselves really matter in 
fostering security cooperation among states? 
                                                      
1 Cabinet Office, “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty”, The National Security Strategy 2010, 
October 2010, pp. 3 and 18  
2 European Council, “Providing security in a changing world”, Report on the implementation of the 
European Security Strategy, Brussels, 11 and 12 December 2008, p. 1 
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The European Union, and the constant process of institutionalization of its security 
policies all through the 2000s, is a case in point of this debate. Deficiencies of 
prevailing theories in accounting for ten years of increasingly institutionalized 
security cooperation within the EU are manifest. The neoliberal argument of a hard 
bargain among states as the only possible method of reaching consensus is not fitting 
in accounting for security integration. If we read the evolution of CSDP with 
neoliberal lenses, we would expect negotiations over European security and defence 
to result in a lowest-common denominator outcome, if not in a quasi-impasse, given 
the widely diverging preferences of EU member states when it comes to security 
integration.  
The reality of the last ten years shows an opposite picture. While the normative vision 
of the EU as the guarantor of a comprehensive approach to crisis management 
gradually became the hallmark of the EU’s role as a global security provider, 
unprecedented institutional developments cropped up across three dimensions. First, 
the building up of institutions and the consequent process of institutional reform, 
leading to the implementation of existing structures and the creation of new pivotal 
ones. Second, the emergence of a European strategic debate, leading to the adoption 
of the European Security Strategy (2003) and to the report on the implementation of 
the European Security Strategy as of December 2008. Finally, the operational 
experience gained by ESDP missions from 2003 onward (Grevi, Helly and Keohane, 
2009). In March 2003, in fact, the European Union launched its first military 
operation (EUFOR Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) using 
NATO assets under the “Berlin Plus agreement”, while the first autonomous ESDP 
military deployment came about only a few months later, in May 2003, with the 
launch of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDC).  
Since then, the EU engaged in more than 25 operations, thus becoming a significant 
actor in crisis management and conflict prevention in many regions of the world 
(Western Balkans, Africa, Middle East, Caucasus, Asia). Besides military operations, 
the EU’s civilian commitment to crisis management embraced a broad span including 
police, rule of law, assistance, planning, monitoring and border missions.  
How did the EU accomplish this if the French and the British can’t agree on a single 
point of the EU security design, and intergovernmental negotiations (i.e. Lisbon 
Treaty) usually witness harsh conflicts between member states as well as between EU 
institutions themselves?  
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Neo-functionalism, certain sub-fields of the neo-institutionalist theory, and more 
recently social constructivism, have shown that endogenous factors can and do 
influence the evolution of institutions, such as culture, ideas, shared meanings, 
discourse, socialization and norms (Haas, 1964; March and Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein, 2001; Peters, 
2005; Héritier, 2007; Checkel 2001; Legro, 1997, 2000; Adler, 1997; McNamara, 
1999). By questioning structuralist and rationalist arguments concerning the purely 
instrumental nature of institutions, these approaches contend that what is “inside” 
institutions (as opposed to what is external to them, that is at the “state” or “systemic” 
levels) is important to determine why and how change occurs. Institutions do not just 
serve state interests: they can and do actually shape them.  
Knowledge is one of these factors. In a wide range of policy areas, knowledge, 
broadly defined as ideas, information, expertise and understanding about a subject, of 
the issues and problems concerning these areas is thus required by policy-makers in 
order to take decisions. As such, knowledge and new ideas may also serve as a 
driving factor leading to institutional or policy change (Haas E.B., 1990; Risse-
Kappen, 1994). The same logic also applies to international security cooperation, 
where the increasingly technical and complex nature of threats demands for an even 
more significant involvement of experts in the decision-making process leading to 
security decisions.    
In the field of European security cooperation3, networks of experts or epistemic 
communities (Haas E.B., 1990) have emerged and exerted influence in shaping policy 
formulation and institutional development (Cross, 2007). As demonstrated by Adler 
and Haas in other policy areas, these communities of experts play a pivotal role in the 
transfer and diffusion of knowledge by promoting a) policy innovation; b) policy 
diffusion; c) policy selection and d) policy evolution as learning (Adler and Haas, 
1992).  
However, their role in shaping security policies has been largely neglected, leading to 
the persistence of two gaps in the literature as yet. First, within the wide literature on 
endogenous processes of institutional change, no extensive study has thus far 
investigated the role of transnational networks of experts in shaping European 
                                                      
3 Cooperation in the field of security includes, but is not limited to, the European Union. Other 
organizations are NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the 
Council of Europe.   
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security decisions (a notable exception being Cross, 2007, 2008), and in particular 
their explanatory power vis-à-vis competing explanations of institutional and policy 
change. Second, theories of IR have failed – if they attempted at all – to explain why 
and how particular types of knowledge are selected and other are discarded4, that is 
what are the governing dynamics of epistemic communities and the consequence on 
the security decisions taken by international institutions. Third, the literature has so 
far treated institutional and policy change as separated focuses of research. Although 
analytically different, policy and institutional change are embedded in the same, 
overarching learning process, which impact on both the structures and dynamics 
leading to policy outputs. In other words, the very definition of “learning” in 
international relations makes sense only if it fastens policy change to institutional 
evolution.  
On that account, my claim is that students of epistemic communities and theorists of 
learning have missed a good opportunity to refine the analytical foundations of their 
approaches by not taking into account the way European security complex system, 
and in particular the EU, is changing to cope with new security concerns. This 
contrasts with the large amount of writings produced in other fields. As a matter of 
fact, the end of the Cold War and the enormous amount of foreign policy change 
witnessed at the time actually pushed scholars to investigate how experts had 
influenced national foreign and security policy-making, with a number of publications 
produced throughout the 1980s and 1990s5. Another stream of publications would use 
epistemic communities to explain international cooperation and institutional change in 
technical areas such as environment, food aid regime or central banks6. However, the 
research agenda has kind of “gone to Rome without seeing the Pope”, since the 
concept of epistemic community has not been employed to investigate change in 
                                                      
4 With the exception of Risse-Kappen’s (1994) analysis of the role of transnational coalitions in 
producing foreign policy change leading to the end of the Cold War. Another exception is the 
“Advocacy Coalition Framework” (ACF) model developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith 
in the late 1980s. Although it was developed initially with the American experience in mind, the model 
applies well to the complex nature of European institutions and to cross-national policy research in 
Europe (Sabatier, 1998). That being said, the ACF framework presents a major shortcoming in that its 
applicability is limited to situations characterized by well-defined coalitions driven by belief or 
knowledge-driven conflict, thus leaving unexplained these situations where conflict between different 
coalitions is less evident.    
5 See the debate on change in US and Soviet foreign policies, which provided new insights on how 
bureaucratic élites or leaders learn or change their beliefs even when security matters are at stake, such 
as in the case of the arms control regime and the antiballistic missile treaty (ABM). On the role of ideas 
and knowledge in foreign policy, see Goldstein and Keohane (1993), Breslauer and Tetlock (1991), 
Checkel (1993), Mendelson (1993), Stein (1994).  
6  See Haas, P.M. (1990), Hopkins (1992), Odell (1988), Drake and Nicolaidis (1992).   
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critical cases such as international security institutions (i.e. NATO, the EU or OSCE) 
as it dramatically and incrementally set off after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
The paradox described above has affected the academic debate on why and how 
security institutions, and European ones in particular, evolve. Of course, the concept 
of epistemic community in itself is not sufficient to account for complex mechanisms 
of change and institutionalization of new norms, practices and instrumental or 
principled ends (another way to define institutional change). Why do epistemic 
communities are, supposedly, so crucial? Because they enable institutions to learn, 
when a conceptual or technical innovation is introduced into the decision-making.  
The conceptualization of institutional learning in IR theory has suffered from the 
same anomaly that characterized the operationalization of epistemic communities. 
Scholars have studied how complex learning occurs in foreign and security policies at 
the governmental level and, as a result, impact on security regimes; theories of policy 
learning have been applied to the analysis of change within international 
organizations, in a wide range of policy area except for security and defence. No 
learning theory explains us today why NATO has evolved from the end of the Cold 
War or how is it that the European Union’s common security and defence policy has 
exhibited such a degree of institutional evolution since its creation.  
The argument of this paper is as follows. Change in European security institutions is 
to be understood and explained as a process of institutional learning. Epistemic 
communities play a key role in prompting the learning process, since they act as 
carriers of new knowledge (innovations) into the decision-making. As a result, 
security institutions evolve according to a process of “epistemic learning”7, meaning 
that epistemic communities are the main actors responsible for policy and institutional 
evolution as learning. In a field that is traditionally the breeding ground for rationalist 
and realist theories of IR, I seek to demonstrate that knowledge, a factor endogenous 
to institutions, plays a role in fostering policy and institutional change, through 
processes of “epistemic learning”.  
To test this argument, I look at the European Union’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP), which in the last 10 years have gone through an incredible evolution 
and exhibited a high degree of change, both in institutional and policy terms. I 
therefore analyze the role of transnational epistemic communities in influencing the 
                                                      
7 I identify three typologies of learning: epistemic, experiential and isomorphic. This paper, as the first 
chapter of my thesis, introduces and develops the first typology.  
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introduction of Security Sector Reform (SSR) policies and practices (and related 
processes of institutional reform) within CSDP. However, as Risse-Kappen put it, I 
acknowledge that knowledge does not float freely (Risse-Kappen, 1994). Structural 
factors within international security organizations facilitate or hamper the impact of 
epistemic communities on decision-making and the effectiveness of the cognitive 
content they carry through. I will demonstrate that the EU system of governance in 
the security domain is experts-prone and it actually encourages the emergence of 
transnational networks having a real impact on what is understood by EU member 
states as “common security”.   
Conclusions are expected to give us greater understanding about the evolution of 
European security institutions and to provide theoretical guidelines for the further 
study of epistemic communities in the field of international security. 
I will proceed as follows. The first chapter provides an overview of the literature on 
the rise and development of European security cooperation and spots out the 
limitations of prevailing approaches to explain institutional and policy change. The 
second chapter gives a general review of the concept of epistemic communities and 
theories of institutional learning. The third chapter presents the analytical framework 
of the paper and the relation between epistemic communities and institutional 
learning. The fourth chapter investigates the emergence of Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) in Europe as a case of “epistemic learning” through which EU institutional 
structures and security policies have evolved. In the conclusion, I draw the 
implications for further research in the field of international security.  
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1. The rise of EU security cooperation 
 
The academic debate on the rise and evolution of the EU security and defence policy 
originated as a result of the failure of the EU common foreign policy to deal with the 
Yugoslav Crisis throughout the 1990s. In particular, the debate revolved around the 
causes and remedies to the EU’s diplomatic échec in the Balkans8 and the redefinition 
of the European security configuration according to the transformations in the post-
1989 international system, namely vis-à-vis the U.S. and NATO (Kupchan, 2003). In 
this regard, the impuissance showed by the EU in the Yugoslav tragedy not only 
reflected a fundamental split in the interests of the three larger member states (France, 
Germany and the UK), but was also the logic consequence of the lack of a military 
underpinning characterizing a European diplomacy “without teeth” (Jopp, 2009). As a 
result, the first attempts to account for the launch of ESDP at the December 1998 
Saint-Malo Summit, and its official establishment six months later at the Cologne 
Summit, described the initiative mainly in terms of a reaction to external 
developments affecting European security (Pond, 2002; Duke, 1999; Cornish and 
Edwards, 2001; in Giegerich 2006). These “external developments” refer to the 
situation in the Balkans, but also the shifting strategic interests of the US from Europe 
to the Middle East and Central Asia, and the ensuing uncertainty about the future role 
of NATO as a security provider in a globalized, multipolar and no longer Eurocentric 
world.  
The initial inclination to emphasize external factors as the driving forces behind the 
creation of ESDP fit in well with the neo-realist paradigm, emphasizing changes in 
the international distribution of power as the key variable affecting states’ behaviour 
and interstate relations. Accordingly, neorealist writings maintain that an increase in 
European security cooperation took place from the late 1990s because of a 
fundamental change in the structure of the international system, which eventually 
affected European states behaviour in an integrative way so as to balance against the 
United States (Jones, 2007; Posen, 2006)9. By pointing to the importance of the end of 
the Cold War in providing an unprecedented stimulus for ESDP, Seth Jones argues 
                                                      
8 As Fraser Cameron put it, “the lessons of the Yugoslav conflict were never far from the minds of the 
negotiators at the 1996 IGC preparing improvements in the CFSP” (Cameron, 1999: 32).  
9 Similarly, Kupchan (2003) maintains that the EU is developing into a peer competitor of the United 
States, and portrays integration as a way to acquire power and project the geopolitical ambitions of 
Europe as a whole.  
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that European states intensified defence cooperation both to increase Europe’s ability 
to project power in an otherwise US-dominated world and to prevent a reunified and 
powerful Germany from developing hegemonic ambitions in Europe (Jones, 2007; 
Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2009). Similarly, Adrien Hyde-Price challenges the argument that 
Europe is “a hard case for realism” (Waltz, 1979). He argues that a “balanced 
multipolarity”, that is a rough equilibrium between Europe’s great powers, has 
reproduced a situation similar to the Concert of Europe that favours a degree of 
cooperation to address shared security concerns and generates a complex mix of 
cooperation and competition characterizing the early twenty-first century Europe 
(Hyde-Price, 2007). Hyde-Price’s conceptualization of “shared security concerns”, 
however, raises the troublesome issue of the building up a foundation of common 
security interests, a puzzle that the neorealist analysis has failed to address.  
The liberal intergovernmentalist school questions the neorealist approach to security 
and defence cooperation and points out the role of absolute gains in shaping EU 
institutional development. Neoliberal institutionalism’s conceptualization of the 
“cooperation under anarchy” shares all realist core assumptions, but disagrees on the 
likelihood of international co-operation among self-interested actors (Risse-Kappen, 
1995). Accordingly, Andrew Moravcsik stresses the importance of endogenous 
sources such as the convergence of member states interests and interstate bargains or 
the pressure from domestic groups having an interest in areas such as the production 
of weapons, economic sanctions and the creation of joint military forces (Moravcsik, 
1999). Without denying the primary role of power and interest in shaping interstate 
relations, Moravcsik contends that the preferences of domestic actors and political 
processes in the domestic policy shape an institutional setting whose inner functioning 
abide by the rules of intergovernmentalism.  
The state remains the main focus of analysis in Michael Smith’s institutional theory of 
the development of CFSP. The central logic of institutionalization, however, pinpoints 
the processes by which an informal, extra legal and improvised system gradually 
fostered the achievement of cooperative outcomes and progressively enhanced its 
own procedures to improve the prospects of these outcomes (Smith, 2004). Such 
paradigm stresses path-dependent effects and incremental institutional development 
as key variables affecting the rise of foreign and security cooperation within the EU.  
Moving beyond the nation state, and drawing from Bertrand Badie’s theorizing of the 
crisis of the nation state and its impact on post-1989 international relations, Fréderic 
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Mérand sets the emergence and development of ESDP in the broader context of the 
decline of nation state’s authority and the advent of transnational governance as a 
driver for institutionalized cooperation in the field of security and defence (Mérand, 
2009).  
The main problem major IR paradigms are faced with in explaining ESDP is that they 
all fall short of examining the interplay of domestic, institutional and external factors 
on the evolution of member states’ position on ESDP since 1998, thus failing to 
provide a thorough and comprehensive account. For this reason, some attempts have 
been made by scholars to overcome theoretical hurdles in order to capture all the 
contrasting dynamics shaping the evolution of security cooperation in Europe and 
conceptualize ESDP. Christopher Hill, in his formulation of the famous “capabilities-
expectations gap”, pioneered the conceptualization of European foreign and security 
policy by suggesting that the EU represents a sub-system of the international relations 
system, which can be understood as composed of three dimensions: a) the national 
foreign policies of member states; b) the CFSP; c) the external relations of the 
European Commission (Hill, 1993).   
Jolyon Howorth’s Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (2007) 
provides a more normative explanation of ESDP. Structural change, according to 
Howorth, is not the only factor that spurred European security cooperation. Two sets 
of combined explanatory variables (exogenous and endogenous factors) account for 
the EU’s move towards a global security commitment (Howorth, 2007)10.  
Lately, precious works have been produced on the application of constructivist-
oriented perspectives to ESDP (Christiansen et al., 2001; Keukeleire, 2010). 
According to the social-constructivist approaches, structures of international society 
are not only material, but also “ideational”:  the nature of actors’ interests and goals 
depends on their identities, social roles and the norms they abide by (Sjursen, 2003): 
constructivism is interested in understanding “how material subjective and 
intersubjective worlds interact in the social construction of reality”, thus seeing 
agency and structure as mutually constitutive (Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1999). As regards 
Europe, constructivist scholars are concerned with the question of why and how do 
individual leaders and institutions of the EU form their preferences, attitudes 
                                                      
10 Besides exogenous forces, Howorth identifies three underlying drivers behind ESDP:  (1) new tasks 
and concept entered the IR lexicon in the post-Westphalian “new world order”, such as crisis 
management, that meshed easily with most of the EU’s values; (2) the reappearance of military conflict 
in the European continent (i.e. Western Balkans); (3) the development of a European defence industry.   
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perceptions and identities in the EU (Ginsberg, 2007). Checkel, for instance, defines 
ESDP as an institutional context within which actors’ identities and interests develop 
and change through interaction (Checkel, 1999). Ben Tonra rejects Moravcsik’s 
approach based on sheer intergovernmental bargain and claims that ESDP’s rules and 
norms actively contribute to create a structure for collective action and sustain the 
building up of a collective identity (Tonra, 2001).  
The constructivist alternative to the study of CFSP/ESDP paved the way for the 
application of the concept of Europeanization to ESDP, in order to test processes of 
adaptation of member states norms and strategic cultures, or to analyze changing 
national security interests through social constructivist lens. Some useful country-
based comparative analyses discovered patterns of adaptation of national cultures to 
the emerging EU strategic culture (Giegerich, 2006) or compared the evolution of 
public and elite opinion in selected countries to find areas of shared consensus and 
norm compatibility fostering the convergence of national interests (Meyer, 2006). Eva 
Gross analyzed British, French and German policies with respect to CFSP/ESDP in 
two specific crises (FYROM and Afghanistan) in order to determine whether 
Europeanization of national foreign security policies occurred or whether other 
considerations (such as the influence of the transatlantic alliance) were more pertinent 
to explain national preferences (Gross, 2007). These writings provide a valuable 
contribution to theorizing European security and defence, as they show the extent to 
which member states’ cultures, values, norms and policies have been affected by EU 
policies. 
 
These theories, however, do not fully account for changes in CSDP structures and 
policies. Neoliberal institutional approaches maintain that states cooperate with the 
assistance of international institutions, and that change essentially relies on the 
bargaining between fixed member states preferences. But how can rational choice 
explain CSDP evolution if states hold different – and in most cases incompatible – 
visions of security integration in Europe? At the same time, while Reflectivist and 
Constructivist writings provide interesting insights into the relation between 
(European) structures and (national) agencies, and appraise the extent to which the 
former induce change in the latter. But they don’t tell us much about the processes 
leading to the implementation of new policies or to the reform of existing institutional 
structures according to changed strategic prescriptions.  
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In other words, all these approaches need to be supplemented by a framework of 
analysis taking into account non-material drivers of change to bridge rational choice 
and prevailing institutionalist theories to explain the source of not only interests but 
also of institutional change. Therefore, I argue that the diffusion of knowledge, and 
the consequent process of collective learning triggered by transnational communities 
of experts, is one of the key elements of this new approach.  
 
 
2. Epistemic communities and learning: “conceptual minefields”?  
 
 
This chapter provides a general review of the concepts of epistemic communities and 
institutional learning as provided by the literature. It therefore paves the way for the 
setting up of the analytical framework defining the dynamics of “epistemic learning”.  
 
2.1 Defining Epistemic Communities 
 
What is “expertise” and why should it matter in international relations? John G. 
Ruggie introduced the concept of “epistemic communities” in a special issue of 
International Organization (1975) co-edited with Ernst B. Haas. According to 
Ruggie, processes of institutionalization11 involve not only the grid through which 
behaviour is acted out, “but also the epistemes through which political relationships 
are visualized”. Ruggie borrowed the term epistemes from Michel Foucault (1970), 
and came to define “epistemic communities” as “a dominant way of looking at social 
reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual 
predictability of intention” (Ruggie, 1975, 569-570; Foucault, 1970). Ernst Haas later 
articulated the idea of epistemic communities as “professionals who share a 
commitment to a common causal model and a common set of political values (Haas 
E., 1990; 41). A more precise conceptualization was finally given by Peter Haas, who 
defines the concept as follows:  
 
                                                      
11 Michael E. Smith’s defines institutionalization as “the process by which institutions, understood as 
behaviours, norms or beliefs, are created, develop and change over time (Smith, 2004).  
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“An epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines 
and backgrounds. They have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, 
which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; 
(2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading 
or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which the serve as the 
basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and 
desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally 
defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their 
expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices 
associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, 
presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a 
consequence”  
(Haas P.M., 1993) 
 
The emergence of epistemic communities is therefore related to the increasingly 
complex and technical nature of the issues decision-makers need to address. 
Accordingly, complexity and uncertainty push decision-makers to seek the advice of 
experts, which hence contribute to the way interests are formulated and decisions are 
taken.  
Epistemic communities constitute an extremely useful conceptual tool, since they 
have provided an important stimulus to research aimed at explaining how policies are 
crafted according to knowledge flows wielded by transnational networks. In fact, they 
allow researchers to identify the missing link between political objectives, technical 
knowledge and the formation of interests. This has profound consequences for the 
study of international relations. In the current international society characterized by 
globalization and interdependence, knowledge and ideas must spread across state 
boundaries in order to be recognized by the wider international community. As a 
consequence, networks of experts cannot be conceived as belonging to single national 
communities separated one from each other. Epistemic communities are transnational 
precisely because their expertise and their “vision” is carried over from the national 
levels into the international (global or regional) arena.  
Rejecting simple notions of causality, in When Knowledge is Power (1990) Ernst 
Haas maintains that international organizations are created to solve problems that 
require collaborative action (among states) for solution; therefore, “the knowledge 
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available about “the problem” at issue influences the way decision-makers define the 
interests at stake in the solution to the problem; (…) when knowledge become 
consensual, we ought to expect politicians to use it in helping them to define their 
interests” (Haas E., 1990, 9-12).   
But how do these networks exert influence on policy-making and how do they 
produce policy evolution? Although the relationship between an epistemic community 
and a policy-maker is complex and operates at multiple levels, Adler and Haas (1992) 
have identified four steps.   
First, epistemic communities act as policy innovators by identifying the nature of the 
issue-area and framing the context in which new data and ideas are interpreted. By 
framing the context, experts guide policymakers in the choice of the appropriate 
norms, tools or institutions within which to manage problems. State interests are 
therefore a consequence of how issues are framed by experts setting the standards of 
policy innovation.  
Second, epistemic communities diffuse their policy recommendations transnationally, 
through communication and socialization processes. New knowledge is shared and 
exchanged across research groups, national governments and international 
organizations through different channels (conferences, meetings, transnational 
research networks). This process of policy diffusion fulfils two purposes. On the one 
hand, it allows innovation to become consensual among members of the community 
and translate into an effective policy advice. On the other hand, it pushes government 
and institutions (who participate to the process) to redefine their expectations, reach 
common understanding and coordinate their behaviour accordingly.  
Third, policy selection mechanisms intervene to select certain advice and discard 
others. Domestic political factors prove important in policymakers’ solicitation and 
use of knowledge provided by epistemic communities. Several other factors, however, 
can hinder or facilitate policy selection, such as timing, regime structure, culture or 
the consensus among community members themselves as well as the content on the 
innovation and the way it relates to the mainstream. The literature on this aspect of 
epistemic communities offers divergent perspectives, depending on the actors, 
institutions and policy involved12.  
                                                      
12 See Adler and Haas (1992); P. Haas (1989) and Sabatier (1998)  
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Finally, policy persistence refers to the continuation of consensual knowledge about 
an issue within the members of an epistemic community, to determine how long it 
will remain influential. The degree of consensus among community members is 
certainly one of the key factors affecting policy persistence (Peterson, 1992; Adler 
and Haas, 1992).  
This four-step process involving innovation, diffusion, selection and persistence is 
therefore understood as the core dynamics leading to policy evolution. In a world 
characterized by increasing interdependence and complexity, conceptual innovations 
are diffused nationally, transnationally and internationally by epistemic communities 
and pave the way for new international practices or institutions. Socialization plays a 
key role in fostering the diffusion and a shared understanding of the issue among 
members of the community and policy-makers.  
Epistemic communities are, therefore, a fundamental source of learning, to the extent 
that they produce permanent changes in the epistemological assumptions and 
interpretations that help frame and structure collective understanding and action 
(Adler, 1991).  
There is no shortage of studies that have used this concept to understand broader or 
specific issues related to institutional or policy change. Besides Ernst Haas’ pioneer 
work on learning and adaptation in international organizations (Haas, 1990), the 
concept of epistemic communities has been applied to a wide range of policy areas 
from environmental issues to central banks (Sebenius, 1992; Kapstein, 1992; Haas, P., 
1990; Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992; Hopkins, 1992), last but not least in the field of 
European Studies (Richardson, 1996; Zito, 2001; Marier, 2009; Radaelli, 2009; 
Verdun, 1999) to illuminate the previously neglected endogenous sources of 
international policy coordination. European Union’s member states too have often 
chosen to rely on a group of experts’ suggestions to agree on a specific course of 
action for increased integration or policy co-operation, as in the case of the creation of 
the European Monetary Union (Verdun, 2010) and more in general in the EC 
decision-making process (Vos, 1997; Radaelli, 1995, 2000, 2009; Richardson, 1996; 
Zito, 2001, 2009). 
However, little attention has been paid to international security organizations and, in 
particular the EU, which in the transition from the Cold War to the post-1989 
international system, and to the post 9/11 era, have experienced significant 
transformation and have undergone a remarkable process of institutional change.  
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2.2   Conceptualizing institutional learning 
 
This section introduces the concept of institutional learning as provided by the 
literature. What do we mean by saying that “international organizations learn” and 
what are the theoretical implications of this claim?  
The notion of “learning” is, to use Jack Levy’s famous expression, a “conceptual 
minefield (…), difficult to define, isolate, measure, and apply empirically” (Levy, 
1994). The literature provides several definitions of learning that cannot be 
congregated in the same formula or channelled through core tenets. A good way to 
put some order to this heterogeneity is to select a limited number of criteria that will 
highlight the key differences between the various definitions and perspectives over 
learning. 
 
Individual vs Collective Learning 
The literature distinguishes two fundamental categories of learning: individual 
learning and collective learning. The interaction between the two is a critical factor in 
learning theories. Levy gives a basic definition of individual learning as “a change of 
beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of 
experience” (Levy, 1994). This type of learning is, as Tetlock put it, “intrapsychic in 
focus”, in the sense that is learning occurs within the minds of particular policy 
makers or individuals (Tetlock, 1991). Using this approach to individual learning, 
Janice Gross Stein (1994) has attempted to explain the development of Gorbachev’s 
cognitive constructs as a case of trial-and-error learning through failure.  
On the contrary, collective learning implies the possibility that a group of individuals 
(a government, an organization, an institution) could learn in much the same way as 
single individuals do, thus having their distinctive (but shared) goals, beliefs, and 
memories. Collective learning, in turn, is commonly classified into two similar, but 
not identical categories: organizational learning and institutional learning. The 
literature on collective learning is extensive and it constitutes the bulk of the analyses 
on learning that have been carried out since the 1980s (March and Olsen, 1988; 
Etheredge, 1985; Downie, 1998; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Haas, 1990). Cyert and 
March have tackled how organizations learn, emphasizing the parameters that 
 19 
organizations set to assess their environment and changes in the rules governing their 
search for information (Cyert and March, 1992).  
Yet part of the scholarship disputes the theoretical viability of collective learning. 
Argyris and Schon, for instance, suggest that “there is no organizational learning 
without individual learning (…): organizational learning is a metaphor” (Argyris and 
Schon, 1978), and Levy contend that the “reification of learning at the collective level 
is not analytically viable”. Nonetheless, when claiming that “an international 
organization learns is a shorthand way to say that the clusters of bureaucratic units 
within governments and organizations agree on a new way of conceptualizing a 
problem”, Ernst Haas made clear that learners are indeed bureaucratic entities, thus 
rejecting the rigid divide between individual and organizational, and singling out a 
collective categorization of learning (Haas, 1990). If we take this view, we can take as 
an assumption that organizations are able to learn through collective cognitive 
processes that are something more than the sum of individual learning. Although 
individuals do play the critical role of setting learning processes in motion (Friedman 
in Dierkes et al., 2001), the individual learning can be seen as a necessary, but 
insufficient basis for organizational learning (Nye, 1987).  
 
The Diffusion of Learning 
The question of the processes leading to the diffusion of the lessons learned, or the 
“how” question, is another crucial aspect of learning. Crossan et al. have specified 
how the process of transmission of knowledge moves from the individual to the 
group: individuals shape insight and innovative ideas, but these ideas have to be 
shared, given intersubjective meaning and then adopted for action, with the ultimate 
aim of being embedded in the organization and made routine (Crossan et al., 1999). 
Accordingly, through a multi-level interaction between individuals, groups and 
organizations, knowledge undergoes a process of communication, integration and 
routinisation leading to its final institutionalization (Zito, 2009). The diffusion of 
knowledge was also addressed by Everett Rogers in Diffusion of Innovations (1962). 
Rogers defines the diffusion process as one by which (1) an innovation (2) is 
communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of a 
social system (Rogers, 1983, 10). Yet Levy is right when he observes that the 
conditions under which new knowledge is diffused and become effective policy 
change are problematic since they vary across different types of political systems: the 
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multistage organizational learning process, Levy claims, can be blocked at any point 
and not all organizational change derives from learning (Levy, 1994). In other words, 
learning itself is not policy change: a combination of different factors (such as 
decision-making structure or orientation of leadership) may determine and explain 
variations in the policy impact of learning, as shown by Risse-Kappen (1994).  
 
Simple vs Complex learning 
The literature makes a differentiation between two levels of learning, according to the 
degree of complexity and the impact of learning on the actors’ behaviour. As Zito put 
it, learning theories vary on what exactly is being learnt, whether learning involves 
simple instrumental change or complex belief change (Zito, 2009). The distinction is 
therefore between “simple” adaptation and “complex” learning, although the same 
notions have been given different labels by students of learning. Argyris and Schon 
break organizational learning into two types: “single-loop” and “double-loop” 
learning. While the former stresses learning that is “instrumental”, and therefore does 
not change the fundamental organizational values, the latter implies that the feedback 
loop triggers a value change transforming the inner mechanisms of organizational 
behaviour (Argyris and Schon, 1996: 20-1).  
In a similar way, Ernst Haas defines adaptation as the process by which “behaviour 
changes as actors add new activities (or drop old ones), thus altering the means of 
actions, but not the ends of the organization”, whereas learning occurs when “the 
ultimate purpose of the organization is redefined as means as well as ends are 
questioned and new ends are devised on the basis of consensual knowledge that has 
become available” (Haas, 1990). As a result, “true” learning would involve a 
reassessment of fundamental beliefs and values and entail a reconsidering of how 
policy makers approach a major problem, hence referring to a situation in which the 
policymakers’ comprehension moves towards a more complex and integrated 
understanding of an issue accompanied by a new formulation of the problem-solving. 
Adaptation, on the contrary, refers to the neorealist reward-punishment conception of 
learning as a response to external contingencies.  
From this perspective then, complex learning is the “true” on, which must include the 
development of more complex cognitive structures as well as changes in content 
(Tetlock, 1991) leading to new priorities and trade-offs (Argyris and Schon, 1996). It 
involves a shift from simple generalizations to “complex, integrated understandings 
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grounded in realistic attention to detail” (Etheredge, 1985), which occurs 
internationally when new knowledge is used to redefine the content of the national 
interest (Haas, 1980).  
However, conceiving learning on a too restrictive complex-single basis has made the 
concept much harder to operationalize. To face this problem, Nye (1987) and Downie 
(1991) have suggested a distinction between broad and restrictive definitions of 
institutional learning. Nye recognizes that there are different degrees of learning along 
a continuum ends-means relationship, from very simple to highly complex. Complex 
learning often involves “evaluative ambiguity”, as perceptions and ideology play a 
larger role in it, thus making it necessary for the students of these processes to be 
explicit about the values involved (Nye, 1987). Downie (1998) explicitly 
distinguishes between broad and restrictive definitions of institutional learning, and 
suggests that neither of them is practical for empirical application as they either widen 
or restrict too much the range of organizational that appear or may be considered to be 
learning (Downie, 1998).  
 
Policy change, progress and collective cognitive processes: competing visions of 
learning?  
Since the 1980s, mainstream research on learning in international relations has gone 
in three directions. A first strand of studies has analyzed processes of policy change 
(foreign policy in particular) building on both collective and individual approaches to 
learning. A second strand has focused on the broader question of international 
cooperation and how learning between two or more states could lead to some form of 
progress in international relations. Finally, the most recent social constructivist 
literature on learning has emphasized processes of collective learning leading to the 
diffusion of norms.  
The “policy learning” strand follows up Deutsch’s work on learning as an element of 
rationalist decision-making theory (1963). Heclo (1974) introduces the concept of 
“political learning”, linking it to underlying processes of “social learning” by which 
“networks of policy middlemen” would convey new ideas into the society and its 
policy making processes. Sabatier constructs the Advocacy Coalition Frameworks 
(ACF) model to argue that, within a given policy subsystem, advocacy coalitions 
composed of actors with similar core beliefs or values play a critical role in shaping 
the learning process through the promotion and diffusion of ideas. Other scholars 
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have built upon an individual approach to learning, based on the lessons that 
individual actors (leaders or senior policymakers) draw from history (Etheredge, 
1985; Hemmer, 2000; Farkas, 1998; Stein, 1994; Levy, 1994).  
Research on learning in international regimes and international organizations 
developed as a result of the pioneering writings of Ernst Haas and Peter Haas (1980; 
1991: 1997) and Adler and Crawford (1991), interested in explaining why and how 
cognitive evolution leads to shared learning (and learning leads to progress) in 
international institutions. These works provide a helpful guidance in order to explain 
how learning may lead to the creation of regimes and regimes, in turn, may promote 
further learning13 (Nye, 1987), and to identify the factors facilitating or hampering 
this process. International learning, as defined by Knopf (2003), is a shared learning 
process in which a set of states agree on some premise that was not always part of 
their past thinking. Such cross-national definition rejects the tenets of the decision-
making approach to learning (Levy, 1994; Etheredge, 1985) and tries to better 
explain, to use Haas’ words, how a common understanding of causes is likely to 
trigger a shared understanding of solutions (Knopf, 2003).  
Due to the importance granted to intersubjective understandings, shared learning has 
captivated the attention of the social constructivist scholarship of international 
relations. Social constructivism also found a particular interest in collective learning, 
namely “shared” learning due to the importance given by this scholarship to the 
diffusion of norms and the processes of socialization. In fact, social learning is well 
placed to be a primary driver of change in Wendt’s theorization of social 
constructivism. Checkel investigated social learning to account for the spread of 
human right norms in Europe (Checkel, 2001). Finnemore has analysed processes of 
internalisation of new norms by states and found out that “countries learn from the 
international environment” (Finnemore, 1996). Yet a major contribution from the 
social constructivist literature on learning processes is still lacking, specifically a 
work that would define in greater detail the advantages and pitfalls of using a lessons 
learned model within a constructivist perspective. 
 
                                                      
13 In his analysis of the impact of learning and regime in U.S.-Soviet security relations (1987), Nye 
maintains that regimes may foster organizational learning by creating or reinforcing institutional 
memory: in fact, by establishing standard operating procedures, regimes constrain certain ideologies 
and reward others, and provide opportunities for contacts and bargaining among leaders, thus affecting 
state behaviour and, consequently, cooperation (Nye, 1987).  
 23 
Epistemic Communities, Learning and European Integration 
Learning and epistemic community are not completely new to European integration 
studies. Some scholars have already “adopted” them, in particular in the field of EU 
governance. According to Zito, the “governance turn” that occurred around 2000, 
implying a shift from macro theories towards analysing the micro processes in EU 
decision-making, has led to a change in preferences in favour of networks and 
learning-driven instruments, making learning a key theme in the EU research agenda 
(Zito, 2009). Verdun, Zito and Cross have used epistemic communities explanations 
to study, respectively, the creation of the European Monetary Union (Verdun, 1999), 
the EU acid rain policy (Zito, 2001) and integration in the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs (Cross, 2007). Studying the EU steel policy, Dudley and Richardson (1999) 
have found patterns of change driven by the interaction of advocacy coalitions 
(Sabatier, 1998). The linkage between EU governance and learning has also attracted 
scholars’ attention. The concept of networked governance (Kohler-Koch, 2002; 
Jordan and Schout, 2006) emphasizes processes of networks-driven learning (Schout 
and Jordan, 2005) and knowledge transfer (Bomberg, 2007, Radaelli, 2009) as the 
basis of the EU multi-level policy-making. A special issue of the Journal of European 
Public Policy (2009, 16:8) has investigated the insights in learning conditions and the 
peculiarities of learning in the EU (Zito, 2009; Marier, 2009; Radaelli, 2009).  
 
 
3. Epistemic learning: the framework of analysis 
 
 
As the previous two chapters have shown, the literature offers differing 
conceptualizations of epistemic communities and learning. How do these fit – or not 
fit – for the purpose of explaining further integration and institutionalization in the 
field of European security? This chapter sets out the analytical framework within 
which to explore the emergence and evolution of Security Sector Reform in the 
European Union. Following a cognitive approach, I argue that consensual knowledge 
can and do influence policies and institutional change. Epistemic learning provides a 
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knowledge-based explanation of how experts influence decisions-makers, and how 
this influence results in change affecting policies and institutions14.  
On that account, I argue that the expansion of activities and, more in general, the 
institutional evolution of CSDP is to be explained as a process of institutional learning 
involving two components: an “epistemic” process of integration of knowledge into 
the decision-making and a “learning” process resulting in observable institutional 
change. Accordingly, new knowledge or information provided by epistemic 
communities (i.e. new strategic prescriptions about security) is first developed and 
diffused, and then institutionalized. The institutionalization of new knowledge results 
in changes in an institution’s structures, norms (formal and informal ones), and 
procedures. Institutional change is measured according to three criteria: goals, means 
and instruments. Goals refer to the ultimate purpose of the institution, its ends, values 
or strategic prescriptions underlying the institution’s means of action. Means refer to 
the organizational structures, programmes and policies that are set out to achieve the 
institution’s goals. Finally, instruments are material and non-material resources 
(capabilities) available to achieve the institution’s goals through its means.  
To sum up, epistemic learning can be defined as a two-stage process by which 
epistemic communities develop and diffuse new principled or causal beliefs into the 
decision-making, resulting in goals, means or instruments-related institutional change.  
Epistemic learning has four main characteristics: it is informal, collective, 
consensual/networked and constrained. Informal means that epistemic communities 
stimulate institutional change by means of an informal method of institutional reform, 
and hence it does not originate in formal negotiations or bargaining processes (Smith, 
2004). Collective signifies that learning is not individual (Levy, 1994), but it is 
assumed that bureaucratic entities and organizations can learn through socialization 
processes (Haas, 1990; Adler and Haas, 1992; Cross, 2007). Moreover, learning is 
also consensual/networked, in the sense that the creation of transnational networks of 
experts, professionals and policy-makers sharing the same principled and causal 
beliefs, and the interaction within these networks is vital to carry through the learning 
process (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Schout and Jordan, 2005). Networking takes place at 
                                                      
14 With reference to the institutional evolution of EU security and defence policy, I identify three types 
of institutional learning: (1) epistemic learning, or learning from innovation; (2) experiential learning, 
or learning-by-doing; (3) mimetic learning, or learning by imitation. The three typologies are currently 
being researched in the framework of my PhD dissertation at LSE (expected date of completion: 
December 2012).  
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two levels. First, within the epistemic community itself, allowing experts to exchange 
their ideas during transnational conferences or workshops. As a result of this process, 
knowledge becomes shared. Second, networking occurs between the epistemic 
community and the decision-making arena, through channels (or policy networks) that 
enable new ideas to be diffused. As a result, knowledge becomes consensual. Finally, 
epistemic learning is constrained: its effectiveness highly depends on a set of 
external/internal factors (Risse-Kappen, 1994) facilitating the diffusion and 
institutionalizations of knowledge. 
How do the two processes (diffusion of knowledge and learning) work? I first assume 
that international organizations are created to solve complex problems for which 
cooperation is considered necessary. These problems, as Ernst Haas maintained, are 
“nested”, that is interconnected with institutions, policies and processes (Haas, 1990). 
This logic also applies to the European Union’s security and defence Policy. By 
introducing new knowledge, or innovative ideas into the decision-making, this 
learning process leads to a redefinition of the problem and of the means or 
instruments to address it and, consequently, to institutional change. On that account, 
drawing from previous conceptualizations of epistemic communities and their 
application to other policy areas, I describe the process of knowledge development 
and diffusion as follows. First, a pool of academics and/or experts generates new 
ideas, or strategic prescriptions. This innovative content constitutes a creative act that 
derives from a different observation of facts, which may or may not follow 
circumstances of policy failure. Second, the knowledge produced is socialized among 
the members of the nascent epistemic communities to achieve its conceptualization 
and the clarification of its normative content. At this stage, initial network building 
takes place, leading to transnational value shaping (Cross, 2007), sharing and 
diffusion. Third, shared knowledge, and hence new norms or beliefs, undergoes a 
process of deliberation and communication. This process is not too different from the 
management of the “brand image” of a company, where symbolic constructs are 
created to associate information and expectations with a given product or service. 
Deliberation and communication result in a set of principles outlining the values the 
epistemic community is advocating, and their promotion within specific institutional 
settings.  Fourth, once it has become mainstream, knowledge is integrated within the 
institution and routinized (or institutionalized) (Crossan, 1999; Rogers, 1962; Zito, 
2009). Institutionalization springs from learning. Learning occurs when the 
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knowledge diffused by epistemic communities become strongly embedded in the 
institutional setting and produce observable institutional change according to the 
criteria defined above. Routinization and persistence then follow, and may lead to 
reassessment by experiential learning to further improve institutional performance. To 
achieve institutional learning, transnational experts need channels into the 
institutional system and institutional partners (decision-makers) to build up winning 
coalitions (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Heclo, 1974). Policy networks are all-important to 
ensure that ideas are injected into a society and its policy-making processes.   
Finally, the constrained nature of epistemic learning processes requires that the ability 
of epistemic communities to influence decision-makers and produce institutional 
change depend upon a set of external and internal factors. Internal factors may include 
the institution’s geographical scope (whether it is a global or regional institution), its 
governance structure (intergovernmental, supranational or multi-level governance), 
the characteristics of leadership, cultural affinity between states members of the 
organization, and, last but not least, the degree of consensus developed among experts 
and the presence of one or more rival coalitions. External conditions refer mostly to 
the structure of the international system – and the shocks producing systemic changes 
(i.e. crises), and the “timing” factor. 
On that account, my hypothesis is that, under certain conditions, communities of 
experts foster security cooperation and institutional change in CSDP, and hence that 
non-material and ideational factors (as opposed to interests and structural changes) 
play a role in accounting for the evolution of the EU security system. Four 
“constraining factors” delineate the conditions under which epistemic learning is 
facilitated or hampered: the structure of EU governance, the compatibility and affinity 
of national strategic cultures, the degree of expert consensus within the epistemic 
community and the presence of constituencies interested in supporting the diffusion of 
new ideas. Accordingly, I formulate my hypotheses as follows.  
 
- The multi-level configuration of EU security governance (supranational and 
intergovernmental) particularly as far as civil-military coordination is 
concerned, increases the possibilities of epistemic learning, since it provides 
experts with multiple points of access to influence decision-making. 
- A high consensus among members of the epistemic community increases the 
chances of epistemic learning.  
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- Similarity or affinity among national strategic cultures enhances the likelihood 
of producing consensual knowledge, therefore paving the way for the adoption 
of the new strategic prescriptions by national experts and their participation 
into the transnational networking process.  
- The presence of constituencies (national, i.e. member states, or transnational, 
i.e. pressure groups) interested in supporting the diffusion of new knowledge 
increases the likelihood of effective network building and epistemic learning 
to take place.  
  
 
4. From epistemes to policies: Security Sector Reform and European 
security cooperation 
 
 
This chapter is incomplete and it represents only a rough draft. Its purpose is to test in 
an epistemological framework the hypothesis that the emergence of SSR in European 
security institutions is a case of epistemic learning. Hypothesis testing requires the 
collection of empirical evidence from interviews and documents produced by experts 
on this sector, a work I plan to undertake over the next few months. The final version 
of the paper will therefore be released once I get hold of all the data, presumably by 
early June 2011. 
Accordingly, I will now introduce the way I intend to organize the chapter and I do 
welcome critical feedback on various aspects, methodological, analytical, and 
conceptual.  
 
Origins and Definition of Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
Security Sector Reform has gained the attention of practitioners and policy-makers 
since the mid-1990s. Its origins are to be located within the broader context of 
evolution of the concept of “security” post-1989 and the growing recognition of the 
connections between security, development, justice and democracy. With the 
progressive blurring of the boundaries between external and internal security, a “new 
thinking” regarding security emerged during the 1990s (Barbé, 1995). This new 
thinking suggested a new paradigm in the development discourse, stressing that 
security and stability, and hence the transformation of ineffective, inefficient and 
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corrupt security forces, would become a necessary pre-requisite for development and 
aid delivery (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006). The international community soon 
adopted the concept of a comprehensive approach merging civilian and military 
means in the conduct of crisis management and peacekeeping operations. European 
donor states headed by the United Kingdom and under the institutional umbrella of 
the European Union, were the first to embrace the concept15, with significant 
implications on their development and security policies (Sabiote, 2010). The 
international juncture at the end of the Cold War, as well as declining military 
expenditures and downsizing state armies (SIPRI, 2006) undoubtedly played a role in 
opening a window of opportunity. The endorsement of the UNDP’s notion of “human 
security”, encompassing the broader and “non-military” nature of security concerns 
(UNDP, 1994), spurred the affirmation of the “security-development nexus” 
(Williams, 2002; Chandler, 2007) as the absolute protagonist of the peace-building 
discourse. The increasing role of the development community in security matters 
would hence result in the rise of comprehensive security programmes aimed at 
tackling a wide range of activities within the broader security sector. As a result, the 
focus on the reform or reconstruction of security actors as a precondition for peace 
and development, effectively branded as SSR, would become the main approach.    
In Europe, the enlargement of Euro-Atlantic institutions dramatically accelerated the 
development and diffusion of SSR. EU and NATO’s support to the transition from 
authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe realized that, to be successful, focus on effective 
security sector reform was all-important. As a result, in 1994, OSCE developed a 
Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Relations that mainstreamed the idea in Europe 
that all security services, not just the military, had to be under democratic control.  
Against this backdrop, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF) defines security sector governance and reform as two related 
concepts:  
 
Security Sector Governance (SSG) refers to the structures, processes, values and 
attitudes that shape decisions about security and their implementation.  
 
                                                      
15 As Ekengren noted, the EU has in itself essentially been a project of security sector reform, built on 
broad transformation of national government including security and defence structures (Ekengren and 
Simons, 2011). 
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Security Sector Reform (SSR) aims to enhance SSG through the effective and efficient 
delivery of security under conditions of democratic oversight and control. SSR offers 
a framework for conceptualising which actors and factors are relevant to security in a 
given environment as well as a methodology for optimising the use of available 
security resources. By emphasising the need to take a comprehensive approach to the 
security sector, SSR can also help integrate a broad variety of actors and processes.  
 
(DCAF, 2009) 
  
SSR approach is by definition holistic, in that it assumes that security has to take into 
account all the institutions and actors that play a role in a country’s security. SSR 
instruments impact on a wide range of sectors: police reform, judicial assistance, 
border training, and can entail post-conflict situations measures such as Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) or Combating Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW).  
For this reason, while it is acknowledged that some generic and general features are 
common to any type of involvement in SSR, many different sub-approaches have 
arisen and were developed by the several external actors engaged in SSR. These 
include state and non-state actors, ONGs and civil society organizations, but in the 
last ten years intergovernmental organizations have tended to play a leading role in 
conceptualizing and implementing the SSR agenda (DCAF, 2009).  
 
Therefore, the concept of SSR has been shaped by a variety of policy experiences. 
Organizations tend to approach SSR from either a development (i.e. World Bank), 
security (i.e. OSCE, NATO, EU), or democratic perspective (i.e. Council of Europe); 
have a global (i.e. UN, EU, OSCE), regional (i.e. African Union, Council of Europe) 
or sub-regional focus (i.e. ECOWAS); maybe active in field activities, such as 
capacity building and technical assistance (i.e. Council of Europe), norm development 
(i.e. OECD) or both (i.e. EU, OSCE); can operate in different country contexts, such 
as post-conflict (i.e. EU, NATO, OSCE), transition countries (i.e. Council of Europe), 
developing countries (i.e. OECD, ECOWAS, World Bank). Although the overarching 
principle and framework of SSR remains the same, each organization has experienced 
SSR programmes in different ways, depending on their specific concerns (problem-
solving), capabilities or geographical scope.  
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Since early 2000s, the European Union has constantly increased its focus on SSR as 
part of its foreign-security policy interface. This process is to be understood as part of 
the evolving goals and means for EU security resulting from its growing fields of 
competences and the changes occurring in its security environment. The EU has 
progressively internalized the SSR discourse and practice as part of the security-good 
governance-development paradigm. These concepts have become the key elements 
justifying EU interventions and ESDP operations (Sabiote, 2010).  
The European Security Strategy (2003) underlines the importance of SSR in 
improving the EU’s capabilities for peace support activities and in achieving its 
strategic objectives in third countries. However, it was not until the “EU Concept for 
ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform” had been released (Council of the 
European Union 2005) that the operationalization and effective integration of the 
concept came into being. The document underlines the importance of SSR in 
“…putting fragile states back on their feet…enhancing good governance, fostering 
democracy and promoting local and regional stability”. The Council’s concept was 
followed by the Commission’s Concept for European Community Support for 
Security Sector Reform of the European Community (May 2006), stating that “SSR is 
an important part of conflict prevention, peace-building and democratisation…SSR 
concerns reform of both the bodies which provide security to citizens and the state 
institutions responsible for management and oversight of those bodies”. A month 
later, in a Council of Ministers decision of 12 June 2006, the EU adopted a “Policy 
framework for Security Sector Reform”16 aiming to pull together the Commission’s 
related activities and doctrines with the military route available to execute and support 
SSR through the common security and defence policy (Bailes, in Ekengren and 
Simons, 2011). Therefore, both the Commission and the Council have rapidly become 
major players in SSR17, in a period that coincides with the rapid expansion of the 
EU’s crisis management structures and activities (Grevi, Helly and Keohane, 2009). 
The Council concept, in particular, stresses the need to adopt a co-ordinated, holistic 
and tailored approach to SSR due to the different European institutions involved in 
                                                      
16 2736th General Affairs Council meeting conclusions, Luxembourg, 12 June 2006. See also Spence 
and Fluri (2008).   
17 The Commission, through its Conflict Prevention programmes for developing countries, its mandate 
for justice and home affairs, and its responsibilities for EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood 
programmes; the Council through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) instruments. 
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the domain. It also emphasizes, in accordance with the OECD-DAC report, the 
importance of local ownership the creation of the conditions for political control as 
the main aim for SSR missions.  
The consequences of the introduction of SSR within the EU, in terms of policies, have 
been quite significant. As of Autumn 2010, 16 out of 28 missions (total including 
completed and ongoing missions) are situated in the SSR field (activities ranging 
from police reform to law enforcement), with 3 of them mentioning explicitly SSR in 
their mandate (these being EUSEC RD Congo, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau and EUTM 
Somalia)18. Several SSR-related concepts, approaches and practices have integrated 
the EU strategic lexicon and greatly shape the EU security posture in both strategic 
and operational terms.  
 
The role of experts in SSR: epistemic learning?  
Interviews and in-depth analysis of the documents produced by experts are expected 
to reveal the existence of groups of experts fulfilling the criteria defining epistemic 
learning (see chapter 4).  
At the global level, the promotion of SSR was transmitted, for the most part, across 
three international fora: the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as part of 
the Millennium Development Goals, the UN Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
OECD’s Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD). The latter, in particular, has 
assumed a key role in the process of conceptualization and consolidation of the SSR 
approach, resulted in the publication of two handbooks: the OECD DAC Guidelines 
on Security Sector Reform (2004) and the OECD-DAC Handbook on Security Sector 
Reform (2007), a platform aimed at providing guidelines for greater coordination and 
effective implementation of SSR, both highly influential on European security 
organizations’ approach to SSR (Bagayoko-Penone, 2009). The OECD DAC 
Guidelines have been crucial in forging a common, transnational understanding of the 
                                                      
18 Notable examples of SSR-related missions are: EUPOL Afghanistan, EUJUST LEX Iraq, and 
EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as well as ESDP 
interventions in the Western Balkans and in the Caucasus. Some examples of activities: Justice 
Reform, Law Enforcement, Civilian Oversight Mechanisms, Public Financial Management Reforms, 
Police Reform, Military Aspects of SSR (EUFOR, RD Congo), SSR Missions (DRC), DDR, Borders 
and Migration Management. For a literature on the analysis of these missions, see: Gross (2009), 
Hanggi and Scherrer (2008), and Grevi, Helly and Keohane (2009), Part II.  
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SSR approach. It can therefore be considered as the reference point for adoption of 
SSR programmes by international organizations, including the EU.  
At the regional – European level, three intellectual sub-communities can be identified 
as part of a broader epistemic community sharing SSR policy concepts. First, the 
OECD DAC, which is both an intergovernmental organization engaging in SSR in the 
framework of its development policies and an important subgroup of the SSR-
epistemic community that namely set the standards for implementation of SSR 
programmes.  
The second sub-community is the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (DCAF), which is composed of policy analysts, scholars and 
policymakers. DCAF played a key role in situating EU Security Sector Reform within 
the larger context of European and Transatlantic SSR, by ensuring development and 
diffusion of SSR concepts through transnational exchanges with other research 
institutes Europe wide. This community has been actively engaged in the organization 
of a great number of conferences over the last ten years to promote networking and 
knowledge-sharing among European policymakers, practitioners, military experts and 
academics19 (Sugden, 2006; Ebnother, Fluri and Jurekovic, 2007). Besides facilitating 
the creation of shared understanding about SSR, DCAF also initiated the process of 
learning by opening channels between experts and Brussels-based policy networks, in 
particular through its offices in Brussels (permanent) and Ljubljana (in the course of 
the Slovenian Presidency of the European Union, January – June 2008).  
Finally, a third important component of the European SSR epistemic community is 
the UK-based Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), 
initially hosted by Cranfield University and now managed by the University of 
Birmingham. The “epistemic” mission of the GFN is stated in the network’s principal 
aims: to “promote a better understanding of security and justice sector reform through 
the provision of information, advice and expertise to practitioners, academics and 
policymakers through the world”20. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
also defined the objective of the network as “to provide knowledge management and 
network facilitation services to an international network of SSR practitioners”21. The 
                                                      
19 An example is the Seminar organized by DCAF and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 
December 2006, bringing together NATO and EU representatives, government officials and experts to 
address the future challenges for SSR.  
20 Source: GFN-SSR website, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/. 
21 FCO (2006), Foreign And Commonwealth Global Conflict Prevention Pools, 15 August 2006.  
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network is funded by the UK Government’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and led by the University of Birmingham’s International 
Development Department (IDD) and the Centre for the Studies of Security and 
Diplomacy (CSSD).  
As part of the broader question of the “constraining” conditions facilitating or 
hampering the emergence of epistemic communities, the case of the GFN – and, to a 
similar extent, of the OECD DAC – provide evidence of the role of constituencies in 
promoting the work of epistemic communities and the formation of consensual 
knowledge. As suggested by Jennifer Sugden (2006), there is an overwhelming 
agreement that the UK is a leader in the field of SSR, and in this regard the DFID is 
described as the “Godfather of SSR”, exerting a significant influence on OECD DAC 
and UNDP in the promotion of SSR (Sugden, 2006). Another interesting case is 
Slovakia, which during its presidency of the United Nations Security Council, in 
2007, organized a wide thematic debate on security sector reform, co-hosted by the 
United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) and the DCAF.  
Evidence from the development of SSR seems also to suggest another consideration. 
The normative elasticity of the European security environment, where norms are 
changing and possibly converging towards the maturation of a European strategic 
culture, although on a lower common denominator, has facilitated the process of 
epistemic learning.  
In sum, informal and non-material factors have pushed European integration forward 
in the field of security and defence, a field that is considered a breeding-ground for IR 
realism. Although the paper still lacks the empirical evidence to validate its 
theoretical arguments, it seems undeniable that the role of knowledge and ideas as 
important factors affecting institutional change – and, as a consequence, states’ 
interests and their cooperative behaviors – is crucial for future applications of 
institutionalist approaches to the study of security cooperation.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
By investigating and reframing the link between epistemic communities and 
institutional learning, this paper has sought to explain the emergence of SSR in 
European security cooperation as a case of epistemic learning, that is a learning 
process triggered by the introduction of new knowledge, or new interpretation of 
facts, by networks of experts into the EU security and defence policymaking. I have 
identified four factors affecting the effectiveness of epistemic communities in 
diffusing new knowledge:  the (EU) governance structure, the compatibility and 
affinity of European national strategic cultures, the degree of expert consensus within 
the epistemic community and the presence of constituencies interested in supporting 
the diffusion of new ideas. These factors define the boundaries within which 
epistemic communities are able to influence the EU policymaking. By applying a 
non-restrictive definition of learning (Nye, 1987), I have defined three criteria - goals, 
means and instruments - to measure learning-driven institutional change.  
At this stage of my research, it is of course not possible to draw a proper 
“conclusion”. I hope, however, that the insights and the ideas this contribution fed 
into the academic debate on European security will generate genuine food for thought, 
as well as possibly critical feedback for further refinement of this piece.   
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